News linked to both this project and an event.
According to CryptoSlate, researchers from USENIX Security publicly disclosed a clock attack vulnerability against Solana’s Proof of History (PoH) mechanism on August 12. The vulnerability had been privately reported to the Solana development team as early as December 2025. Research indicates that a malicious scheduler leader could manipulate the PoH logical clock through "re-anchoring," slowing the progression of logical time. This would yield a longer transaction selection window within physical time, allowing the attacker to isolate honest leaders' blocks via the TowerBFT fork-choice mechanism, with the required stake for the attack falling below 33%. The Alpenglow security contest hosted by Anza, which offered a 50,000 SOL prize pool, concluded on August 19. However, the vulnerability was excluded from the evaluation scope because the contest rules explicitly excluded "behaviors that can only be triggered when Alpenglow is inactive." The Solana development team confirmed awareness of the issue, stating that the probability of the worst-case scenario occurring under current conditions is low. They expect the Alpenglow upgrade to fundamentally eliminate the attack's prerequisites. The Alpenglow code is already integrated into the Agave 4.2 client but remains inactive on the mainnet, with full deployment expected alongside Agave 4.3. Until then, the transitional risks associated with this vulnerability have yet to receive public implementation-level analysis or official responses.
: Cardano ecosystem wallet project SecondFi has announced the launch of a wallet migration tool and revealed a recovery plan for assets affected by the June 2026 security incident. As the project will cease operations, users are required to migrate remaining assets still held in SecondFi wallets. The migration tool is expected to go live on August 13, supporting the transfer of eligible ADA, Cardano native tokens, and NFTs to new Cardano wallets created with service providers of the users' choosing. Currently, the tool only supports Cardano network assets; non-Cardano assets must be transferred separately through corresponding network and wallet processes. SecondFi stated that the migration tool has passed an independent security assessment by security firm Bitdefender. For affected assets, SecondFi plans to launch a recovery portal before September 10, where users can verify wallet ownership via zero-knowledge proofs (ZK Proof) and submit asset claims. SecondFi reminds users to only rely on information published through official channels, including @secondfiapp, @secondfi_jp, and the official support website, to guard against phishing sites and impersonating accounts.
security firm Project Eleven has introduced a post-quantum proof technology designed to help users prove ownership of their Bitcoin wallets after quantum computers become capable of deriving private keys and generating valid signatures. Project Eleven CEO Alex Pruden stated that the technology utilizes the wallet's key derivation path, enabling users to prove control without disclosing the parent key, thus distinguishing legitimate owners from attackers. The solution was developed in collaboration with Jim Posen, a primary maintainer of the open-source Binius zero-knowledge proof system, and is based on the "signature lifting" technique proposed by Alon Sattath and Robert Wyborski. Project Eleven noted that the prototype has not yet been audited and requires blockchain protocol support before it can be deployed. It is primarily aimed at users who miss the window to migrate to quantum-resistant addresses in the future.
According to analysis by BlockSec Phalcon (@Phalcon_xyz), Aztec Network's RollupProcessorV3 contract was attacked, resulting in losses exceeding $2.15 million. The root cause is that `numRealTxs` was not effectively bound to the transaction set enforced by the ZK proof, causing a deviation between the proof verification path and the L1 settlement logic's interpretation of the transaction list.The attacker exploited this vulnerability to move real deposits to slots not processed by the settlement logic, bypassing the `decreasePendingDepositBalance()` function. By creating unbacked private balances out of thin air, they were able to withdraw funds through the normal settlement process. A total of seven assets were involved.
According to BlockSec Phalcon, the HandlerV1 contract managed by Hyperbridge on the Ethereum network was found to contain a Merkle Mountain Range (MMR) proof replay vulnerability, resulting in approximately $242,000 in losses. The vulnerability stems from the lack of binding between proofs and requests, enabling attackers to replay historical valid proofs alongside newly forged requests to perform malicious actions—such as altering administrator privileges. In the specific incident, the attacker changed the Polkadot (DOT) token administrator and then exploited those privileges to mint additional DOT tokens for profit. Observed attack transactions include: changing the DOT token administrator and minting new tokens (losses of ~$237,400), changing the ARGN token administrator and minting new tokens (losses of ~$3,800), and host withdrawal operations. The vulnerability was discovered by PhalconSecurity and analyzed via PhalconExplorer. Previously, the Hyperbridge gateway contract was attacked, leading to the unauthorized minting and subsequent dumping of 1 billion DOT tokens on Ethereum.