News linked to both this project and an event.
According to Onchain Lens monitoring, Reental suffered an attack on Polygon. The attacker gained access through an admin-controlled contract upgrade, which exposed the protocol's USDT and USDC reserves. The attacker then used the modified contract to transfer funds out, causing approximately $454,000 in losses to @Reental_co.
Blockaid reported that Reental on Polygon was attacked, with approximately $454,000 drained from aToken through two transactions.
Binance and Polymarket have proposed implementing a hard fork on the Polygon network to recover approximately 70.49 million stolen POL tokens, valued at about $6.8 million. Of these, Polymarket-related addresses account for 23.86 million tokens, while Binance-related addresses account for 46.63 million tokens. The tokens are planned to be transferred from 5 attacker-controlled addresses to verified recovery wallets designated by the two platforms, without changing the total POL supply.Polygon block producers have already blocked transactions from the affected addresses, but this restriction is only a temporary measure and cannot return the funds to their owners. The plan requires governance approval and must first be tested on the Polygon Amoy testnet, with discussion expected on November 5. The mainnet hard fork date has not yet been determined. (Cointelegraph)
The Polygon community has proposed transferring approximately 70.49 million POL tokens associated with the hack incidents involving Polymarket and Binance via a hard fork, pending governance approval.
The exchange confirmed that users will not incur any asset losses due to this incident. The platform has suspended deposits, withdrawals, and platform services, and has notified the relevant authorities. Preliminary analysis suggests that the attacker may have compromised the signing credentials required for transaction authorization. According to Bitquery, the suspicious transfers span multiple networks including Ethereum, Bitcoin, Solana, Stellar, Arbitrum, Tron, and Polygon, while the specific intrusion vector remains undetermined.
Odaily reports: According to an official announcement from Binance, Binance has resumed withdrawals in phases, with the first batch being the Bitcoin network.Previously, Binance published a security incident recovery progress announcement stating that it planned to restore the first phase of withdrawal services between 14:00 and 17:00 (UTC+8) on November 1.The first batch supports networks and assets including BTC, ETH, BNB, TRX, SOL, XRP, ZEC, DOGE, TON, POL, AVAX, ARB, BASE, OP, and SUI. Additionally, Binance stated that there may be brief delays initially due to traffic, and other networks and assets will be opened successively once ready; deposit services remain open.
Binance has published a security incident recovery progress announcement, stating that it plans to resume phase one withdrawal services between 14:00 and 17:00 (UTC+8) on November 1.The first batch supports networks and assets including BTC, ETH, BNB, TRX, SOL, XRP, ZEC, DOGE, TON, POL, AVAX, ARB, BASE, OP, and SUI. In addition, Binance noted that there may be brief delays initially due to traffic, and other networks and assets will be opened successively once ready; deposit services remain open.
Aave officially stated that the precautionary freeze measures taken following the Binance security incident have now been lifted, and all markets on Aave V3 and V4 have returned to normal. Previously, after receiving initial information about the incident, Aave paused new deposits and borrowings, but users could still withdraw assets and repay loans normally. Aave emphasized that its smart contracts were not affected by the incident, and user positions remained fully collateralized at all times. As an ongoing precautionary measure, the LTV of USDT, USDC, USDT0, POL, WAVAX, sAVAX, XAUT, PAXG, and OP will temporarily remain at 0, and these assets cannot be used as collateral for new borrowings.
According to monitoring by Bubblemaps, the hack of a third-party service provider for Polymarket has resulted in the theft of assets belonging to over 700 users, totaling approximately $3.46 million. Of this amount, roughly $2.7 million has been converted to POL and transferred out, while approximately $0.75 million remains in Polymarket.
According to Decrypt, Polymarket has switched trading to cancel-only mode and paused relay operations due to a security incident, with multiple users reporting unauthorized asset transfers. The suspected attacker's address holds approximately $2.65 million in POL.
Polygon Labs has announced the official release of Bor v2.10.3, which fixes two medium-severity denial-of-service vulnerabilities in BlockSTM V2 parallel block execution. Both issues were reported through the Immunefi bug bounty program.In addition, the new version includes multiple security and stability improvements, such as transaction filtering, RPC execution concurrency limits, and pending transaction cleanup. The team stated that the affected versions are Bor v2.10.1 and v2.10.2, where BlockSTM V2 is enabled by default, and that no exploitation of these vulnerabilities has been detected on the mainnet or the Amoy testnet. This upgrade does not involve a hard fork, and nodes can upgrade gradually as needed.
According to on-chain investigator vxdb, the Gamdom platform was targeted in a security attack. Preliminary data indicates that attackers stole approximately $2.2 million worth of assets across EVM-compatible chains, including Ethereum, BSC, Polygon, Arbitrum, and Optimism. Additionally, the Solana network suffered losses of around $965,000, while the TRON and Bitcoin networks each lost approximately $375,000 and $668,000, respectively. The total value stolen across all chains now exceeds $4.2 million.
Odaily report: According to RevokeCash monitoring, if users have previously traded NFTs on the Magic Eden Ethereum marketplace, their wallets may have granted approval to Limit Break's Payment Processor contract; this contract currently has a known vulnerability, and it is recommended to revoke the approval. Magic Eden previously stated that NFTs currently still listed on its platform are not affected by this vulnerability; NFTs listed through its EVM marketplace between approximately February 2024 and October 2024 may be affected, while listings after October 2024 are in principle not affected. Magic Eden is contacting protocol owner and maintainer Limit Break to study other risk mitigation measures, including pausing protocol transfers, and continues to investigate the actual scope of impact.Users who have previously listed or traded NFTs on the Magic Eden EVM marketplace should revoke the relevant contract approvals on Ethereum, Polygon, and Base networks, and revoke all NFT approvals marked as "approved for all." Yuga Labs Blockchain Vice President Quit stated that the asset claim website for the Payment Processor vulnerability NFT theft incident has officially launched; affected users whose NFTs were successfully safeguarded can now claim, but must first revoke their approval to the Payment Processor.
Magic Eden clarified on the X platform that Payment Processor V2, an NFT trading protocol under Limit Break, was recently exploited. Magic Eden stopped using this protocol in October 2024 and will completely shut down its EVM marketplace in Q1 2026, so this exploit did not affect existing Magic Eden listings. However, NFTs listed on the Magic Eden EVM marketplace from February to October 2024 may have been impacted, and users should revoke the "Approve for All" authorization for the contract on Ethereum, Polygon, and Base. Additionally, Magic Eden stated it is collaborating with Limit Break to investigate and seek further mitigation measures.
According to Cointelegraph, Polygon disclosed several previously undisclosed security vulnerabilities affecting its Bor and Heimdall clients, which could lead to denial of service (DoS), validator resource exhaustion, and anomalies in checkpoint and milestone processing. The relevant vulnerabilities have currently been patched through two hard forks: Austin and Kyoto.
Polygon disclosed multiple hidden security vulnerabilities affecting its PoS network and implemented preventive fixes through a recent fork, with no evidence of actual exploitation.
Odaily News – SlowMist security team has disclosed the discovery of a GitHub repository impersonating the Qwen 3.8 27B local quantized model. The repository claims the model size exceeds 16 GB, but the actual downloaded content is only about 487 KB, containing disguised files, a LuaJIT interpreter, and obfuscated Lua scripts. SlowMist emphasized that the official Qwen project has not been compromised. According to SlowMist's analysis, once executed, the malicious program collects host data, captures screenshots, and sends them to the attacker's C2 server. When the hardcoded server becomes inactive, it reads a backup C2 address from a contract on the Polygon chain, allowing attackers to rotate infrastructure through on-chain transactions. Subsequent payloads can steal browser login credentials, cookies, browsing history, email accounts, WinSCP and Steam credentials, as well as wallet-related files and extension data. SlowMist also discovered at least 23 GitHub repositories and 29 similar archive files using the same Lua delivery chain.
blockchain gaming platform The Sandbox has announced it will compensate users who held bridged SAND on Base or BNB Smart Chain prior to the August 21 bridge vulnerability exploit at a 1:1 ratio. The compensation will be paid using Ethereum-based SAND from the project treasury, with no new tokens being minted.The attack resulted in approximately 14.744 million SAND being stolen from the Ethereum treasury, valued at around $700,000. The claims process is expected to open within two weeks and will last for two weeks; two centralized exchanges holding over 72% of eligible balances will directly distribute compensation to affected customers.The Sandbox stated that the attacker exploited a configuration vulnerability in SAND contracts on Base and BNB Chain, becoming the sole validator of bridge messages and minting unbacked tokens. Additionally, over 339 trillion unbacked SAND tokens were minted across the two networks, but these have been quarantined and cannot be bridged or exchanged. SAND on Ethereum and Polygon was unaffected, and the compromised bridge contracts will be permanently decommissioned. (Cointelegraph)
Odaily News, The Sandbox has released a post-mortem report on the August 22 vulnerability incident. The report shows that attackers exploited vulnerabilities in contracts related to cross-chain configurations on Base and BNB Smart Chain (BSC), stealing 14,742,341.84 SAND from the Ethereum treasury, accounting for approximately 0.5% of the maximum supply, with an estimated economic impact of approximately $1.4968 million, of which about $987,000 was actually retained by the attackers. The Ethereum mainnet and Polygon network were not affected. Until further notice, please do not purchase or send SAND on Base or BNB Smart Chain. Contracts deployed on Base and BNB Smart Chain have been permanently deactivated and will not be reopened. The Sandbox stated that the team has reported the attacker's wallet address to blockchain analysis firms TRM Labs and Chainalysis, and has communicated directly with relevant exchanges. The Sandbox also announced a compensation plan, which will compensate wallets that legitimately held cross-chain SAND on Base or BSC prior to the incident at a 1:1 ratio in Ethereum SAND. Compensation funds will come from The Sandbox treasury, with no new tokens issued. The claim process will open within the next two weeks and remain open for two weeks.
Odaily News, SlowMist Security Team disclosed that the cross-chain bridge project Allbridge suffered an attack on August 19, 2026, with losses of approximately $190,000. Notably, this attack was not executed instantaneously—the attacker began laying the groundwork nearly a month in advance, bypassing the verification mechanism through forged cross-chain messages.According to SlowMist's analysis, on July 26, the attacker directly called Circle's MessageTransmitterV2.sendMessage function on the Polygon chain, constructing a cross-chain message disguised as CCTP-style, claiming a transfer of 1 million USDC, despite no actual USDC burn operation occurring. Subsequently, Circle generated a valid attestation for this complete message following standard procedures.Approximately 24 days later, on August 19, the attacker waited for the Base Router to receive a genuine CCTP deposit, bringing its balance to approximately 191,000 USDC, then launched the attack just 6 seconds later. Using the previously forged message and attestation, the attacker called Allbridge's receiveCctpMessage function. Due to the project's lack of critical validation, the system mistook the fraudulent cross-chain message for a genuine deposit and recorded a 1 million USDC credit.Subsequently, the attacker borrowed approximately 809,000 USDC temporarily via an Aave flash loan to match the Router's balance with the forged amount, then utilized the internal credit record to call the transfer function, ultimately moving out approximately 999,000 USDC (after deducting a 0.1% fee). After repaying the flash loan and fees, the attacker netted approximately $189,800 in profit. The root cause of this vulnerability lies in Allbridge's failure to verify the identity of the cross-chain message sender and receiver, as well as its failure to confirm whether USDC was genuinely minted or whether the balance actually increased—instead directly trusting the amount and message hash data constructed by the attacker.SlowMist emphasized that on-chain message verification does not equate to actual asset arrival. Cross-chain protocols must not only verify message authenticity but also ensure the message source is trustworthy, confirm the receiver is Circle's official TokenMessengerV2, and only record assets after confirming actual minting and balance changes. This incident once again highlights the security risks in cross-chain bridges' message verification and asset settlement processes.