News linked to both this project and an event.
Open-source Bitcoin payment processing tool BTCPay Server received multiple reports on November 1 alleging unauthorized theft of funds from Bitcoin and Litecoin hot wallets on its platform. On November 2, the project team released an investigation update confirming that the attack targeted servers running BTCPay Server version 2.4.1 or earlier. Attackers exploited a vulnerability that had been fixed in version 2.4.2 on August 7, using various methods to gain server administrator privileges and drain hot wallet funds. BTCPay Server founder Nicolas Dorier confirmed that only servers running versions prior to 2.4.2, particularly version 2.4.1, were affected; no credible loss reports have emerged from users running the latest version 2.4.7. Some affected service providers, including LunaNode, have automatically shut down vulnerable legacy instances. The official recommendation is for users still on 2.4.1 or earlier to immediately transfer any remaining funds from old hot wallets to new wallets created with a fresh mnemonic phrase, take the old servers offline and preserve relevant logs, then install the latest version on a brand-new virtual machine and connect the new wallet. Under no circumstances should the old server be restored in its entirety to a new machine. Updating the software version alone is insufficient to eliminate the risk, as attackers may have already established persistent access on the old servers. Funds stored outside the server, such as those in hardware wallets, were not affected by this incident. The vulnerability is related to one fixed in August of this year, when attackers manipulated nodes by obtaining LND administrative credentials. As of now, the vulnerability has not been assigned a CVE number and is not listed in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
Odaily reports: Jiang Zhuoer, founder of Litecoin Pool, posted on X platform that Binance's potential loss accounts for a limited proportion of user assets and is not expected to trigger a large-scale wave of withdrawals.He compared this situation with the Bybit theft incident in February 2025: Bybit was hacked for approximately $1.46 billion at the time, accounting for 9.01% of its approximately $16.2 billion in user assets; if Binance's gross outflow this time is $5.64 billion, of which $3 billion has been frozen, the net amount after deduction would be approximately $2.64 billion, accounting for 1.6% of its approximately $165.12 billion in user assets.In addition, the gross outflow may also include internal fund transfers by the platform and normal user withdrawals, and cannot all be regarded as stolen funds. Binance is capable of bearing the relevant losses.
According to SlowMist, its security personnel discovered during routine threat intelligence monitoring that the Udesk customer service system-related script udeskApi.2026-10-16.cached.js has been implanted with a malicious loader. The loader hides the address using hexadecimal encoding and asynchronously loads the remote script deeps.js (originating from udeskqlobal[.]com; note that the domain starts with the letter 'q'). This script reads page-accessible Cookie, localStorage, and sessionStorage data, intercepts form submissions and login/authentication requests, and sends the data to udeskqlobal[.]com/c.php, enabling attackers to hijack sessions or take over accounts. This data collection behavior is not restricted by target site policies, and unmatched pages may also be affected. According to SlowMist's analysis, the script also targets three categories of sites: mgbx[.]com, bikingex[.], and bitxex[.]io. It scans deposit pages every 200 milliseconds and replaces recognized deposit addresses with preset BTC, EVM, TRON, Solana, LTC, and DOGE addresses. Additionally, by wrapping the Clipboard API, replacing copy buttons, and intercepting copy events, the script ensures users only see and copy tampered addresses. If users transfer funds to these addresses, the assets will flow into the attacker's wallet.
Odaily News, January 10 - A Bitcoin and Litecoin holder provided a 12-word recovery phrase to attackers impersonating Trezor support personnel, resulting in the theft of approximately $282 million in assets, including about $139 million in Bitcoin and $153 million in Litecoin. Blockchain forensics firm ZeroShadow stated that the incident stemmed from a social engineering attack, not a compromise of wallet software or private key infrastructure. The stolen funds were split via the THORChain cross-chain bridge within minutes and converted into Monero through instant exchange services. ZeroShadow's monitoring team flagged and froze approximately $700,000 in funds within 20 minutes. Under the BIP39 standard, a 12-word recovery phrase contains approximately 128 bits of entropy, while a 24-word phrase contains 256 bits of entropy. Chainalysis estimates that up to 23% of all mined Bitcoin is permanently inaccessible due to lost keys, involving millions of BTC, with causes including forgotten recovery phrases, damaged backups, and a lack of inheritance planning.
Litecoin disclosed on X platform that a recent zero-day vulnerability once led to a DoS attack, affecting the operation of major mining pools. Mining nodes that were not updated in time allowed an invalid MWEB (MimbleWimble Extension Block) transaction to be executed, enabling the relevant tokens to be withdrawn to a third-party DEX. The Litecoin network rolled back these invalid transactions through a 13-block reorganization (reorg), confirming they would not be included in the main chain. All valid transactions during this period were unaffected. The vulnerability has now been completely fixed, and the network has resumed normal operation.